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A MODEL OF TRADE AND EXChANGE RATE PROJECTIONS
ABSTRACT
This paper develops and applies a model of world trade and
exchange rates to analyze dynamic interaction of the current account and
exchange rate. The model is designed to concentrate on the determination
of trade flows, prices and exchange rates for the OECD member countries
but it also covers oil exporting countries, other developing countries
and Centrally Planned Economies.
The model contains exchange rate equations, based on the asset
market approach, for major OECI) countries andadjustablepegging rules
for small OECD countries and for non—oil LDOs.Theseprovide the link
from asset accumulation through the current account to the exchange rate.
With the integration of exchange rate equations into the trade model, it
can be used to analyze outcomes of different exchange rate regimes and
alternative growth prospects in the OECD area.
Simulation results indicate that the model produces a smooth and
slow adjustment process for exchange rates and current accounts. They
also show that with the higher growth target for an individual country
large current account deficits may occur or large changes in real exchange
rates are needed to reach the external equilibrium.
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This paper develops and applies a model of world trade and exchange
rates to analyze dynamic interaction of the current account and exchange rate.
The model is designed to concentrate on the determination of trade flows,
prices and exchange rates for the OECD member countries but It also covers oil
exporting countries, other developing countries and Centrally Planned Economies.
The model contains exchange rate equations, based on the asset market
approach, for major OECD countries and adjustable pegging rules for small OECD
countries and for non—oil LDCs. These provide the link from asset accumulation
through the current account to the exchange rate. With the integration of
exchange rate equations into the trade model, it can be used to analyze outcomes
of different exchange rate regimes and alternative growth prospects in the
OECD area.
Simulation results indicate that the model produces a smooth and slow
adjustment process for exchange rates and current accounts. They also show that
with the higher growth target for an individual country large current account
deficits may occur or large changes in real exchange rates are needed to
reachthe external equilibrium.
It must be, however, emphasized that the projected changes in market
shares and exchange rates reflect the growth assumptions and the introduction
ofdifferent exchange rate regimes as well as historical income and price
elasticitiesin international trade. That is why they are conditional and
should not be interpreted as forecasts of future develpments of trade flows and
exchange rates.
The paths for potential and actual GDP in the OECD countries are generated
by a small model which projects output based on growth in productivity and
labor force and which projects investment requirements for ten major OECO countries.—2—
Table 1 illustrates a few results of a model simulation. For this
run the growth rate of actual German GD? was increased by on percentage point
for the 15—year run. Germany, of course, runs a larger current account deficit
and its exchange rate depreciates and its inflation rate increases. Strong
effects are seen for the other European countries: all appreciate and experience
reduced inflation rates. While the smaller countries gain market shares and
improve their current accounts, the larger countries lose market shares and
have worsened current accounts. The non—European countries are little affected.
The macro model for each country takes as inputs the following time
series; male and female working age population, level of armed forces, full
employment" level of the unemployment rate, sector—specific equilibrium capital—
output ratio, depreciation rates, and shares of total output. Using these time
series as inputs into a small econometric model for each country, levels of gross
domestic product, employment, capital stocks and investment requirements by
sector are generated for the 1976 to 1990 period. Different projections may be
made by either altering the time series inputs or by providing different values
for the parameter estimates used in the equations.
The international model determines equilibrium trade flows, prices, and
exchange rates for the 26 regions. The GDP results from the individual macro
models are used as inputs into import—demand equations for three types of
traded goods: non—oil merchandise, oil, and non—factor services. Import
demand in each category is a function of domestic GD?, the import price, and
the domestic GD? deflator.
Thw GD? deflator depends on an exogenously—specified production—cost
index and import prices. Export prices are a function of the domestic price—3—
TABLE 1
Changes Caused by Increased German Growth
Note: More complete results are gi'en later in the paper.




































































































as well as all other export prices. The import prices are determined by a
trade—weighted average of export prices, and the exchange rate.
Bilateraltrade flows are determined by import demands and a bilateral
import—share matrix. The share matrix is adjusted every period to reflect
changesinrelative export prices and exchange rates.
Several options for exchange rate determination are built into the model.
The first is to allow exchange rates to adjust to give Balance of Payments
flow—equilibrium for all regions. The second option is for fixed exchange rates;
treating changes in international reserves as a residual item to balance each
region's international payments. The third option is to solve for major
countries dollar exchange rate from empirical asset market equation. Then the
payments are balanced by additions to or subtractions from the region's net
foreign assets. Countries for which the exchange rate equations have been
estimated are Canada, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Italy, Japan, and the
U.K. The small countries exchanged rates are either fixed (OPEC, the LDC's, and
the Centrally—Planned Region) or are determined by a rule which pegs each region's
currency to a weighted average of its trading partner's currencies.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. Section II explains
the simple procedure used to project growth in real and potential output.
Section III covers projections for investment requirements in ten major OECD
countries. Section IV gives a brief explanation of the trade and exchange rate
model and presents results from several simulations.
II. Projections
Potential output projections were performed for twenty—one OECD nations.1
The following paragraphs are a step—by—step description of the output projections.
Labor Force
To provide a numerical basis for analysis of the long—run aggregate growth
1Greece, New Zealand and Turkey were excluded from theoutput projections due
to lack of data.—5—
prospects,we have begun with the projections of underlyingdemographicchange,
I •e•thegrowth in workingagepopulation (15-64 yearsold),andassumptionsregard-
ing theevolution of labourforceparticipation rates. These described the potent-
ial supplyof labour resourcesavailable in each country.Theprojections of work-
ing age population are drawn frc country responses to the ITERFUTURES' question-
naire or United Nations' projections on the basis of internal analysis. Participa-
tion rates of the civilian labour force are based on national projections and ItO
estimates. Table 2 contains historical and projected growth rates of working-age
population for twenty-one countries
TABLE 2
Average Annual Growth Rates
of
Total WorkingAgePopulation
65—75 75—80 80—85 85—90 75—90
Australia 2.1 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.6
Austria 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.1 0.6
Belgium—Lux 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.4
canada 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.0 1.5
Denmark 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.4
Finland 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2
France 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.7
Germany 0.4 0.4 0.9 —0.5 0.3
Iceland 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4
Ireland 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3
Italy 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.5
3apan 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9
Netherlands 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.6
Norway 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4
Portugal 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6
Spain 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.9
Sweden 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
U.k. 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.3
U.S. 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.9—6—
Employment
The labor force is equal to the level of workingage population multiplied
by the participation rate. From this value a constant level of armed forces
is subtracted to arrive at the civilian labor force.
For each country, a "potential" or "full—employment"unemployment rate is
used to arrive at potential employment. These potentialunemployment rates are
drawn from INTERFtJTURES internal studies. Table 3 displays the assumedpotential
unemployment rates andprojectedgrowth rates for potential employment.
Theprojections show that the higher growth rates for employment will be
inAustralia,Canada, Iceland, Ireland, The Netherlands, and the U.S. Low rates
ofgrowth are projected for Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.
TABLE 3
Potential
Growth Rates of Potential Employment
Unemployment _______________________________________
Country Rate 75—80 80—85 85—90 95—99
Australia 2.0 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.5
Austria 2.2 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.4
Belgium—Lux 3.5 1.1 0.6 —0.1 0.6
Canada 4.5 2.4 1.2 0.8 1.5
Denmark 4.5 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.6
Finland 3.3 —0.1 0.6 0.3 0.3
France 2.1 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.6
Germany 1.3 0.9 0.9 —0.5 0.4
Iceland 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.8 1.3 Ireland 5.0 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.3
Italy 2.5 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.5
Japan 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7
Netherlands 1.3 1.5 1.2 0.6 1.1
Norway 1.9 0.5 0.4 0O 0.3
Portugal 0.0* 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.5
Spain 3.0 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.8
Sweden 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Switzerland 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3
U.K. 1.6 0.5 0.3 —0.2 0.2
u.s. 4,5 2.5 0.9 0.5 1.3—7—
Productivity
Historical trend growth rates of output per man—year was taken from
estimates of simple labor—demand equations for the twenty countries.These
regressionswere runusingdata from 1960 through 1975. Due to the very
simple specification of the labor—demand equation, theestimated growth rate
of output per man year includes both a measure of technical progress and any
trend in the wage/rent ratio.
For 1975 to 1980, the trend value was used to calculate potential
productivity. For the remaining years, the growth rates were changed to
represent a convergence of OECD productivity levels and growth rates.We
assumed that productivity levels would not surpass those of the U.S. and that
the productivity rate of growth would equal that of the U.S. when the levels
were equal. For each country, we assumed that the convergencewould occur
between the year 2000 (for Japan) and 2025 (for the lowest productivity countries).
These assumptions imply the path of productivity growth rates given in Table
4 (See page 8). The low productivity countries will have high rates of growth
and conversely for the high—productivity countries.
Potential Output
Potential output is equal to full—employment times the level of potential
productivity. The projected growth rates are shown in Table 5. (See page g).
The rates of growth for Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal seem implausibly
high. The implausibility lies in the paths of productivity growth rateassumed
for each.
Reaching Potential Output
As of 1978, none of the twenty countries were at potential output. Moat





1975* 1975—1980 80—85 P5—90 75—90
Potential
Productivity
Australia 8.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Austria 6.2 5.5 3.9 3.5 5.0
Belgium—Lux 8.4 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.8
Canada 11.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2
Denmark 7.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Finland 6.0 4.8 A.6 4.3 4.6
France 8.4 4.4 4.1 3.7 4.1
Germany 8.8 4.5 4.1 3.6 4.0
Iceland 6.8 2.3 2.8 3.3 2.8









Netherlands 8.6 5.2 4.5 37 4.5
Norway 9.2 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.7
Portugal 2.8 7.4 7.0 6.5 7.0
Spain 3.9 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.4
Sweden 9.5 2,6 2.7 2.7 2.7
Switzerland 8.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3
U.K. 5.7 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.2
u.s. 13.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
* Measuredin thousands of 1970 U.S. $peremployee
**ForJapan the estimated trendgrowth rateof productivity was8.7%.For the
projections this wasreducedto 6.7%.
and haveproductivitylevels wellbelowthe estimated potential level.
For the particular projection shown here, we arbitrarily assumed thatboth
productivity and employment reach their potential levels in 2000. Both
valueswere linearly interpolated between their actual 1978 value and the
potential levels in 2000.Average Annual
—9—
TABLE 5
Growth Rates of Potential Output
1
75—80 80—85 85—90 75—90
5.4 4.5 4.4 4.8
6.4 5.7 4.6 5.6
5.3 4.5 3.4 4.4
4.6 3.4 3.1 3.7
4.0 4.0 3.6 3.9
4.7 5.3 4.6 4.8
5.3 5.0 3.8 4.7
5.4 5.0 3.0 4.5
5.6 4.1 4.5 4.7
5.7 5.6 5.8 5.7
6.3 6.2 4.9 5.8
7.6 6.8 6.0 6.8
Netherlands 6.8 5.8 4.3 5.6
4.7 4.1 3.4 4.0
8.2 7.5 6.8 7.5
6.7 6.3 5.8 6.3
2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8
Switzerland 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.7
3.3 3.6 3.5 3.5
4.4 2.7 2.4 3.2
Table(See page 10) displays the 1978 ratiosof actual to potential
for both productivity and employment in thefirst two columns. The third
column contains the percentage shortfallof actual from potential GDP in 1978.
The final column gives the average growth rateof GDP from 1978 to 1990. Note
that the required growth rates are very highfor several countries; especially
Austria, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.This may point out the unreason-
ableness of the assumed productivity growth paths.It is also of interest that
the shortfall of GDP from potential is almost entirelydue to a shortfall in
productivity: the shortfall in employment playsa relatively minor role.—10—
TABLE 6
Country 1978 1978 1978 Growth Rate Ratio of Ratio of % GDP Gap of GDP Actual to Potential Actual to 1978-1990
Productivity Potential Employment
Australia .86 .96 15.6 5.3 Austria .84 .99 15.4 6.2 Belgium .85 .97 16.5 5.0 Canada 1.00 .98 1.2 3.4 Denmark .89 .99 11.8 4.5 Finland .86 1.00 14.8 5.9 France .93 .97 9.0 5.0 Germany .89 .96 14.3 5.1 Iceland .93 1.00 10.4 4.9 Ireland .83 .99 17.9 6.7 Italy .94 .98 7.4 6.1 Japan .86 1.00 14.4 7.3 Netherlands .85 .97 17.4 6.3 Norway .89 1.00 10.4 4.4 Portugal 1.08 1.00* —8.0 6.9 Spain .88 .98 13.5 6.9 Sweden .92 '..OO 7.7 3.2 Switzerland .81 1.00 18.7 4.6 U.K. .97 .96 7.0 3.9 U.s. .95 .98 6.7 3.1
*Asmentioned earlier Portugal has no unemploymentrate in this model and is
always at "full employment."
III, Investment Projections
III. A. Countries and Sectors
This section presents a simple quantitative frameworkfor analysis and pro-
jections of fixed investment needs for a sample of OECDcountries consistent with
the output projection described in theprevious section. Given the output devel-
opment, a central question is what level of capital stock and thuswhich flow of
gross fixed capital information are implied by suchgrowth prospects. We could
not do an all—inclusive study of capital requirementsin the OECD area due to the
data problems and time constraint; our intentioni to cover eno'gh of the import-
ant countries so as to be confident thatany serious prospective problems or
policy issues wouldcometo our notice.—11—
Theprojections span the years 1979 to 1990 and the countries included in the
exercise are:
1. Belgium 6. Japan
2. Canada 7. Netherlands
3. France 8. Sweden
4. Germany (Federal Republic of) 9. United Xingdom
5. Italy 10. United States
For each of these countries the same methodology was used to project invest-
ment requirements. Although the nature of capital requirements is similar
in most of the OECD countries the problems InSouthern.European labour sur-
plus countries may be different fran the problems of industrialised countries
in our sample and thus called for a different approach from ours •Inorder
to allow for different sectoral capital intensities each economy was divided
into four sectors. These are as follows:
1. Agriculture.
2. Industry (mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity,
gas and water, construction).
3 •Privateservices (including housing).
4. Public services.
The following set of equations was designed to carry out projections.
III. B. The Model
Assuming theexistenceof a stable relationship between desired capital
stock (IC) and output (7) and a constant depreciation rate of capital (&),
wecan derive the following set of relationships between full employment
output (1),fullemployment capital stock ()andgrossinvestment (I).
(1)1i•v 1—1,2,3,4
(2)GjICiKi i—1,2,3,4
(3) — — C1(1979)(T —t)
I —1,2, 3, 4
T
(4)IjAXi+jKj i—1,2,3,4—12—
Equation (1) projects the full employment stock ()ofsector i given
the full employment capital output ratio (i),sectori's value added
share (vj) and full employment CD?(5.Notethat we have applied the
same value—addedshareprojections to both potential and actual GOP.
Equation (2) gives the gap (C1) between full employment capital stock
and actual capital stock. The actual capital stock appraoches the
full employment path according to equation (3),wherethe gap isclosed
duringeleven years time of recovery (T11, t0, ....11).
Equation (4) simply expresses grossInvestment needs in each sectoras
a sum of net investment andreplacementinvestment, which is a constant
fractionof capital stock. Allthestock variables are beginning of
periodfigures. The total investment and capital needs and the whole
economy's capital gap are computed by adding up the relevant variables.
All thevariables are measured in constant 1975 U.S. dollars.
III C. Derivation andPro1ectionsof the Parameters inthe Model
The parameters to be estimated inthemodelareequilibrium (full employ-
ment) capital output ratios ()anddepreciationrates (&)ineach sec-
tor as well as value—added shares (vj) of each sector.
Full employmentcapital—output ratio
Weassume thatin1973 the economies In oursamplewere In equilibrium
in the sense that there wasjustenough fixed capital in each sector
to fully employ the labour force given the development of relative
prices of capital andlabour. This assumptionis basedon the fact
that 1973was a cyclical peak inmost of these economies •More
critical than the choice of thefull employment yearmay be the
assumptionthat inthis year the labour—capital mixwas optimal given
developrent ofwage—rentalratio. Nevertheless this assumption allows
usto calculate full employment capital output ratios which are also
"desired"or equilibrium ratios, If there are no underlying forces to
changecapital—labour-mix. These capital—output ratios by country
and by sector are shown in Table—13—









2.2 2.1 3.1 2.8 2.6
2.Canada 5.0 2.5 3.1 3.7 3.0
3.Prance 2.5 2.1 3.3 3.5 2.7
4.Germany 5.6 4.2 2.7 4.0
5.Italy 2.0 1.8 3.4 1.8 2.4
6.Japan 1.9 2.2 3.1 2.7
7.Netherlands 1.8 2.3 3.5 4.4 3.0
8.Sweden 5.6 2.9 7.8 4.1 4.9
9.United Kingdom 3.3 2.4 3.1 3.5 2.9
10.United States 3.1 2.1 3.3 3.2 2.8
Source: See text.
Depreciation rates
The long—term model of the United Nations EconomicCommission for
Europe(the exogenous variables of the SEMModel:Past trends and
projectedvalues 1977) provides estimates for sectoral depreciation
rates(agriculture, industry, privateservices, excludingresidential
and publicservices)byEuropean sub—regions (North, West andSouth
Europe). These were applied to correspondingindividual European
countries in our sample. Depreciation rates for the United States
were taken tobearithmetic means of European rates. In publicser—
maindatasource for the sectoral capitalstock seriesis a Rand
Corporation Study by Stein and Lee (1977)except for Sweden.For Sweden
the capital stock data are availableinthe Swedish national income
account statistics. Since capital stock data by sectors are very scarce
and thereare largedifferencesbetweenthe various sources, we wanted to
exploitonecommon source (Rand Study) asmuch as possible in orderto
providecomparability between countries. Also resourcesavailable for the
studydid not allow a morecareful andrefined treatment of the data. Conse-
quently, the data and theprojection resultsare suitableonly to evaluate
generaltrands and directions of changes. Sectoral output data for all coun-
tries come from OECD national income accounts except for Sweden where corres-
ponding Swedish national sources were used. Different sources of data for
Sweden may also explain itshighest capital-output ratio inthe sample.—14—
vicesthedepreciation rate for the United Stateswas expectedto be
aboveEuropean average and was taken to be 3 per cent per year. The
same figures were also applied to Canada and Japan except that in the
case of Japan the depreciation rate inagriculture was chosen to be the
seine as in "North Europe." The values of U.S. depreciation rates were
checked against the information provided by another ECE source (BCE:
Capital Stock: Assessment of Past and Current Trends by Sectors and
Countries, 1977), an OECD study, 'Measurement of capital (Ward 1976),
and a U.S.growthmodel (Iiclonan and Coen, 1976). These shoved large
variations between different sources and gave little indication as to
which direction to adjust our estimates.
TABLE8:Depreciation Rates
Private Public AgricultureIndustryServicesServices
1. Belgium— 3 4 4.4 2.1 1.7
tuxambourg
2. Canada 4.5 5.0 2.2 3.0
3. France 6.4 5.4 2.0 2.7
4. Germany 6.4 3.0 2.7
5.Italy 6.4 5.4 1.5 2.7
6. Japan 3.4 5.0 2.0 3.0
7. Netherlands 3.4 4.4 1.8 1.7
8. Sweden 3.4 4.4 1.8 1.7
9.UnitedKingdom 6.4 5.4 2.0 2.7
10.United States 4.5 5.0 2.0 3.0
Source: Seetext.
Depreciation rates (Continued)
Depreciation rate estimates for private service sector including
housing were obtained by weighting together depreciation rates for
private services excluding housing, and the depreciation rate for
housing which was fixed to be 1.5 per cent for all countries except
Italy, and the United Kingdom. For these countries a lower value of
1.0per cent wasused on the basis of the average age estimates of
buildings and structures givenin Ward (1976). The relevant weights
are relative capital stock sharesin 1973.—15—
Value added shares
The projections of the compostion of output were obtained mainly by
extrapolating the past trends. Value—added shares in each economy
were projected up to 1985 and then kept at this level. This is more
or less arbitary, but nevertheless allows us to have some kind of
idea of future capital needs during the recovery period with
structural cahnge.
Projected value-added share changes imply a generalized decrease
in the value-added share of agriculture. Industry's share is increasing
in all countries except in the United States where it is slightly de-
creasing. In general, the projected increase in industry's share is
larger the higher the growth rate of total GDP during the recovery
period. Government's share is assumed to stay more or less constant.
The resi!ua1 item private services —showsa moderate decline in
most of the countries, In the absence of any better information, value
added share projections were applied to generate both potential and
actual sectoral output paths.
III D. Generation of the capital gap at the beginning of 1979
Given the potential GDP projections described in Section II to gen-
erate sectoral full employment capital stocks in each economy. The actual
sectoral capital stock figures at the beginning of 1979 were obtained by
cumulating investment on 1973 stocks allowing far capital retirement using
the sectoral depreciation rates given in Table 8 (See page 14). In the
absence of any quantitiative information, we did not try to take into account
possible increased scrapping proposed on the hypothesis that large shifts in
relative prices after the oil crisis made some of the existing capital obsolete.
Thus, our actual capital stock numbers in this sense can be interpreted to
represent a kind of upper baindary and thus they may underestimate the actual
capital gaps. Sectoral gross investment numbers come from OECD national income
accounts or from OECD Economic Outlook for the period 1973-1978. Where in-
vestmentin real terms was not available onsectoral level nominal investment
sharesareapplied to split total real fixed investment which was available
for each caintry. Given these capital stocks, capital gaps are defined as the
difference between full employment capital stock and the actual—l 6-.
one. These gaps are showninTable 9 (below) for industry and f or total
economy.The capital gaps thus dependon the growth of full employment capital
stockand the investment flow (given depreciation rate), out of which two
the latter is more important in most cases.
TABLE 9:Capital gaps in the beginning of 197,9
WholeEconomy Industry
% Billion 1975 US$ % Billion 1975 US$
1. Belgium—Luxembourg 1.4 2.9 15.4 10.9
2.Canada 2.3 13.5 8.8 16.0
3.France .9 10.0 19.9 73.0
4.Germanya/ 16.2 378.0 18.5 384.0
5.Italy 1.5 8.0 8.7 14.0
6. Japan —1.4 —28.0 26.1 193.0
7.Netherlands 12.4 42.3 25.0 27.0
8. Sweden 5.8 21.7 9.6 9.0
9. United Kingdom 1.5 11.0 15.5 43.0
10.United States 7.7 399.0 4.7 59.0
a/For GermanyIndustryalso includes Private Services.
Source: See text.
The results indicate varations In the extent of the present capital
shortfall across the countries in our sample but also large differences
within each country across sectors. At the aggregate level, the gaps are
insignificant in the cases of Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and
the United States. At the other end of the list are the Netherlands, with
Sweden falling in between. In the case of Canada, the explanation Is
obviously the increase in energy investment projects. In France, the decline
Inprivate sector investment was compensated by increasing public Investment
inelectricity, and In Sweden the increase was delayed until 1975 by stimul-
ative fiscal incentives.—17—
There are good reasons to expect thatthe housing stock estimate in 1979
is too low due to the high depreciation rateused in the Rand Corporation
Study for housing. This implies that wepossibly underestimate the aggregate
capital—output ratio in the service sectorincluding housing which in turn
means a downward bias in capital requirementestimates. In order to have some
idea of the quantitative effects of different capital—output ratios, we
inereased the full employment capital—output ratio in the private—service
sector by 20 per cent and carried out the needed calculations.The results
show that there is now a capital shortfall in each country. Also, at aggregate
level, increases in the gap vary between two and four percentage pointsbut
in general, the ranking of the countries has not changed. Thiscalculation
indicates that on the basis of the present analysis, it is difficult to
estimate whether at the aggregate level the capital stock in the "boundary
countries" (Belgium, Canada, Prance, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) is
sufficient fully to utilise the labor force.
At the industry level, there seems to be a capital shortfall ineach country.
The relative gap exceeds the limit of ten per cent in all other cases except
Canada, Italy, Sweden and the United States. Japan andthe Netherlands are now
the problem countries with capital gaps over 25 per cent. Thereis one obvious
reason for the differences between gap estimates atthe aggregate level and
at the industry level: the inclusion of the housing sector into privateservices.
III. E. Investment Returns
The estimates of the current capital gap and the growth of full employment
capital stock give a growth path for future capital requirements.This path
implies a stream of gross fixed tnvestment consistent withit. Table 10 (See
page 17) shows such investment as a percentageof total GDP (in industry's
case investment as a percentage of industry's value added.)—18—
TABLE 10: Investment—GDP Shares, %
WholeEconomy; Industry Investment Investment—industry GDPratio, ' value-addedratio, %
1975—1978 1979—1990 1975—1978
1. Belgium—Luxembourg 21.4 20.0 13.9 22.6
2. Canada 22.8 20.8 19.4 23.2
3.France 23.4 22.7 13.4 24.8
4. Germany 20.9 36.1 19.3 38.0
5. Italy 20.8 22.2 16.6 22.3
6.Japan 30.2 27.4 14.5 31.4
7. Netherlands 20.9 28.4 14.0 28.3
8. Sweden 19.4 28.3 15.3 24.5
9.United Kingdom 18.5 20.9 14.7 25.9
10.UnitedStates 18.2 18.8 16.2 17.9
Source: See text.
The most critical assumption may be a constant equilibrium capital-
output ratio. As the price of other inputs rise relative to the cost
of capital, the optimum capital-output ratio in production will rise
ascapital is substituted for the other inputs. Since 1973 the relative
priceof energy has risen perhaps fourfold. The relative price of labour
has also risen, especially in the continental European countries. The
increase in relative prices of energy and labour, would increase the
equilibrium capital—output ratios again raising the investment require-
ments of Table 10.
Moreover,a number of other factors might call for an upward adjust-
ment of our assumed equilibrium capital-output ratio suchas a shift
towards a relatively greater share of large—scale projects in total
investment activity (energy sector being aprime example), an increase
inthe share of investment directed to environmental protection, and-.19—
competition from some fast—growing LDCs leading to potentially faster
rates of structural change, accelerated capital obsolescence and thus
increased full-employment capital output ratios. With this in mind the
investment requirement projections should be interpreted to represent
some kind of minimum alternative consistent with the growth path towards
full employment.
At the aggregate level a slight decrease in the investment sharein
Belgim, Canada, France and Japan is projected. For the United States,
the United Kingdom and Italy, there is a minor increase in the invest-
ment share. A general conclusion might be that for these countries
capital requirement implies more or less stable investment shares out
of GDP. For Germany, Netherlands arid Sweden the increase in the invest-
mentshare is most striking. In the case of Germany the estimate may
be out of any reasonable projection range. For all countries, the
investment—valueadded ratios in industry are high historically. In
the projections, the only country with investment requirements in in-
dustry not significantly greater in the projections than during 1975-
78 is the United States. In general, simply filling in the shortfall
of investment since 1973 will requirehigh investment ratios during
the recovery period.
The investment "requirements" of Table 10 are in a sense minimum
estimates, and thus give the most optimistic view of the potential
difficulty with capital formation to 1990.Ifthe size of the capital
gaphas been underestimated, or if events since 1973 have increased
optimal capital-output ratios, then the investment requirements should
be adjusted upwards. There are several reasons to expect that the
Table 10 estimates are, indeed, low.—20—
IV. A Modelfor Trade and Exchange Rate Projections
IV.A. Introduction
Thispaper outlines a model of world trade and exchange rates. The
modelling effort was not focused on producing original research in the inter-
national trade and financial fields, but on constructing a calculating machine
that would give us reasonable projections of trade volume and exchange rates,
given assumptions on alternative development in the OECD economies, developing
countries and centrally planned economies •Themodel covers 26 regions, of
which 23 are members of the OECD. The non—OECD world is covered by the last
three regions. The regions are:
I. AuBtralia 14. Norway
2. Mstria 15. Portugal
3. Belgium—luxembourg 16. Spain
4. Canada 17. Sweden
5. Denmark 18. Switzerland
6 •Finland 19. United Xingdcmi
7.France 20. United States
8. Germany 21. Greece
9. Iceland 22. New Zealand
10. Ireland 23. flirkey
11.Italy 24. Non—oil LDCs
12. Japan 25. OPEC
13. Netherlands 26. Centrally Planned Economies
It can be used to project changes in the pattern of international trade in
goods and services •Thechannels through which trade pattern change are
relative price changes and differential rates of growth in the domestic eco-
nomies. These changing patterns of trade will have importantconsequences
for bilateral economic relations andacountry's balance of payments position.
The model thus allows us to investigate possible balance of payments diff 1—
culties arising from alternative domestic macro projections. Countries can-
not indefinitely maintain large current account deficits or surpluses without
experiencing some change in the exchange rate or an impact on the internal
balance. The model will give indications of such payments pressure on any of
the countries with alternative assumptions of the time paths of exogenous
variables.—21—
The model is driven by time paths of several macroeconomic variables and
the values of the parameters in the equations forming the model. The list
of variables that control the external sector differ by region. For the
23 OECD regions the main exogenous variable is real CDP. Other exogenous
variables for the OECD regions are net labour incomes, net private trans-
fers from abroad and the initial value of net capital incomes from abroad.
For OPEC,importsof goods and services are exogenous •Alsoexogenous are
the small current account items: the net labour incomes and private trans-
fers. The only difference for the Centrally Planned Economies region Is
that net capital flow is the main exogenous variable rather than imports.
The treatment of non—oil LDCe Is roughly similar to that of OECD countries.
Projections with the model can be carried out in several alternative modes.
First, the model could be used to project developments of current account for
each country and region with the assumption of fixed exchange rates •This
alternative means projecting world trade with exogenously projected import
market shares, because there are no endogenous changes in relative prices.
the other hand the model lends itself easily to analysis of a case of
adlustable exchange rates. This approach assumes that exchange rates are
adjusted to maintain some target current account balances, and then calcu-
lates the necessary changes under the projection assumptions. The calcula-
tions use estimates of trade price elasticities to move the trade share matrix
through time.
The adjustable exchange rate projections are not the same as projections of
what would happen with flexible rates. Recently, the theoretical literature
has turned to the so—called asset market model of flexible exchange—rate
determination in which the key role of the exchange rate is the relative price
of national monies rather than national outputs. In this model, short—run
stability of the foreign exchange market depends on asset substitution, rather
than trade elasticities. This approach has been used to determine the six
key exchange rates and these equations are linked to the trade model. We be-
lieve that it is important to Integrate these on the empirical level In order
to study the dynamic stability of the exchange rate in the long—run because
this is one of the key issues for a flexible exchange rate regime. With this
integration the model can be used to analyse outcomes from choices of differ-
ent exchange rate regimes.—22—
IV. B. Model Structure
Inthe following sections 1—7 weoutline themodel's structure.Theappend:Lx
gives the list of equations in the model anddescribes in detail how the empiri-
cal estimates for the parameters of the model are obtained. Direct econometric
estimation of the modelisnot tried andwe donot provide anynewempirical
evidencehere. Instead we try toexploit current theoretical knowledge and
empirical relationships including existing trade andexchangerate equations
for different countries or more comprehensive trade models used inOECDor IMP.
They help us to derive the empirical parameters estimates needed for the model.
We have, however, made several adjustments to the existing trade elasticities
and to the mathematical formsofequations in order to guarantee plausible long—
termproperties of the system. Section 8 gives the first projection results
andconcludesthe paper.
1. Import Equations
In the import side we distinguish between imports of good and services and
petroleumImports. In postulating an import demand function for goods and
serviceswehavetaken imperfect substitution view of international trade
inwhich domestic and tradeable goods are sufficiently non—substitutable
In order to generate finite price elasticities: The share of real Imports
of goods and services out of real GDP depends on the relative full employ-
ment output gap and relative prices. This type of equation has the property
that in the long—run when the economy is on its full employment output path
income elasticity of imports equal unity and the long—run import /GDP ratio
is constant if relative prices remain unchanged. We have aggregated imports
of goods and services, because very few elasticity estimates for services
are available and because in many cases it is plausible to assumethat
services import flows and goods import flows are closelyrelated. This type
of equation isappliedto all OECDcountries.Petroleum imports arere-
lated toreal GDP and relative price of petroleum (CDP prices divided by
oil prices) for all importing regions. For non—oil LDCs the volume of im-
ports is decomposed into two parts: an exogenouslyprojectedcomponent—23—
(which is equal to their real GDPgrowth)and a component which reacts
to changes in LDCa import prices relative to their GDP prices. For
Centrally Planned Economies value of total imports is a residual item
in the current account equation.
2. Export Equat ion
For our export block we have taken a market share approach. Given esti-
mates of each country's imports by equations described above, exports
of each country can be determined through import market share matrices.
The market share approach is applied to the determination of exports of
goods and oil. Services are treated differently, because we do not
have the necessary data for bilateral services flows.
The question is how best to obtain projections for the share matrix, be-
cause market shares vary over time due to changes inrelativecompetitive-
ness which can result from changes in relative prices or other factors
such as export promotion, delivery times etc. In the model Import market
shares of goods are assumed to respond to changes in relative prices and
to relative non—price competitiveness measured by the growth of the ex-
porting country's potential output relative to a weighted average of the
growth of its competitor's potential output, i.e. countries with rapidly
expanding capacity relative to others are assumed to capture markets.
Changes in oil import shares are determined exogenously.
For exports of services we assume that there is a single international
trade pool of services to which all exports are delivered. The relative
change in each country's share depends on the relative change in its
export price relative to the "world price" of services and on the relative
change in its potential GDP relative to a weighted average (service export
shares as weights) of the relative change in its competitors potential CDP.
The relative output terms stands for non-price competitiveness as in the
case of goods market share equation.—24—
3.Export Prices
With the assumption ofimperfectcompetition ininternationalmarkets
the supply function of exports should bespecifiedas some type ofprice—
settingbehaviour. For a small country with no market power in the export
markets,the price of exportswouldbe givenin foreign currency. If
the country has some market power its exports prices change less than
competitors' prices or costs of production can be passed to its export
prices to a certain extent. Assuming constant priceelasticitiesof
export supply and demand therelative change in exportprices can be
expressed as a weighted average of the relative change incompetitors'
price3 andtherelative change ina variable measuring domestic cost
developments.We have approximatedthis cost variable by domestic price
level.This is carried out for later purposes inorder to integrate
domestic prices into the model.
Therelevantmeasure for the competitor's price variable is a doubly
weightedexportprice index of country i'scompetitors in the export
market..First a competitor's price for the country i on the j'th
marketis calculated as a weighted average ofall other supplier's
priceon that market. Then these indices are again weighted, the rele-
vantweights being shares of exports of the country in question toeach
market country. Thecompetitor's price inserviceexport price equation
reducesto a coiimion "worldprice." This type of equation is applied in
the model to determination of the export prices of goods andservices.
Priceof petroleum is treated exogenously.It is one ofthe key input
variablesof interest in the model.
4.ImportPrices
Given the detetmination of export prices, import prices for each region
inthemodelcan beeasily determined as weighted averages of these ex—
port prices withmarket sharesas weights. This applies to import prices
ofgoods and petroleum where the weights to be used areimport shares of
goods and petroleumrespectively. For services we have acommon world price
equation wherethe weights are world trade shares of services of each
country.—25—
5 •QirrentAccount Equation
In order to obtain current account equations for each region, the deter-
mination of aid flows, factor Incomes and net private transfers in the
current account are needed •Thetotal amount of aid received by non—oil
LDCa is projected exogenously. The Increase Intotalaid flow is allo-
cated between donor countries according to constant 1975 shares •Netinterest
incomes from abroad are generated as a multiple of "world interest rate,"
exogenous to the model, and cumulated current account of each country.
Other terms in the current account, i.e., net private transfers and net
labor Incomes from abroad are determined exogenously outside the model.
Finally we have a current account equation for each region. For centrally
planned economies current account balance is fixed outside the model and
the value of imports isthe adjusting item, i.e., we assume that this
regionuses all its foreign currency receipts to buy Imports.Allthe
building blocks of the model are constructed in a way which automatically
takes into account the world trade balance and current account constraints.
6.The Effect of Import Prices on the Domestic PriceLevel
Thereare severalways through which the domestic price level can be
affectedby international price developments. First, domestic prices
maybe changed if there is substitution between tradeable anddomestic-
ally produced goods. Price effects from the tradeable goods sector cana
also channel through labour markets to the prices of non—tradeable goods.
Inaddition, the abosrption of externalinflationary pressuresmayhappen
throughprices of Imported raw materials and petroleum, which calls for a for-
mulation of a cost—push model. Here we limit ourselves only to the latter
approach. Pt this stage we also ignore inflation coming from domestic
developments.!" Thus in the model variation in the domestic price level
comes through changes Inimportprices of goods and petroleum. It should
be noted here that we have assumed no change in relative prices between
traded finalandintermediate goods, and thatis whyImport price of goods
(excluding oil) serves as a proxy for Import price of raw materials in the
domestic price equation. This naturally means that the model shows only the
inflationary effect of the pressure coming from Import price Increases. Never-
theless, it adds one important link to the model and thusprovides a more
plausibleapproximation of reality than a purely exogenous treabnent of the
domestic price level.
work is In progress to capture effects of different money growth rateson
Inflationrates and exchange rates.—26—
7.Exchange Rate Block
From the early 1970e onwards countries adopted a wide variety of exchange
rate systems. Major countrieshave had more or less floating ex—
change rates since 1973 while several small OECD economies and developing
countries chose to peg their currencies to some basket or a single currency)-j
We have tried to capture some basic lines of the present policy-": the
currencies of the big seven OECD countries are floating, smaller OECD
countries and developing countries peg their currencies in an adjustable
way to a trade weighted basket; oil trade and Centrally Planned Economies'
trade with the rest of the world is Indollars.With the integration of
exchange rate equations into trade model, it can be used to analyse out-
comes from choices of different exchange rate regimes.
The trade block of the model generates projections for the current account.
The link from the current account to the exchange rate for floaters is
obtained by applying the asset market approach (see e.g. Branson, 1977)
to determine (dollar/local currency) exchange rates for Canada, France
Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. With flexible exchange rates
the sun of balances on capital account and current account for these coun-
tries is identically zero (central bank foreign reserves stay constant) eIf
the current account shows a surplus, the capital account remains in deficit
and the private sector accunulates foreign assets. According to our equa-
tions this moves the exchange rates in the short run. Changes in the ex-
change rates will affect trade flows and change the current account which in
turnmoves the exchange rate. In the model, a current account deficit
(surplus) of country i will cause its currency to depreciate (appreciate).
This In turn improves (worsens) the current account•Thelong—run dynamic
adjustment thus happens through the interaction of exchange rate equations
and the trade block. The effect of the exchange rate movement on trade
takes time and enoughtime must pass to bringthe current account to zero.
However, In the projections we would not necessarily expect to see balanced
current accounts as exports and imports are moved through growth rates of
GDP which may differ from country to country. Smaller OECD countries and
non—oil LDCs peg their currencies to a trade weighted basket in an adjustable
1/ Branson and Papaefatiatiou (1978) offer an extensive discussion of criteria
of choosing an exchange rate regime, see also Heller (1976).
2/ The major drawback here may bethatthe present EMS is not ndelled. This
is an important topic tobe integrated intothe model.—27—
way. The value of country i's currency against its trading partners'
currenciesis changed according to a criteria which says that countryi
isdevaluing(revaluing) its currency against other currencies when it is
running a current account deficit (surplus) by a certain amount of its
relative (current account over value of exports) current account deficit
(surplus). The devaluation (revaluation) percentage is, however, dependent
on last period's policy: ifacountry devalued (revalued) last period and
if it is still running a deficit (surplus) this period's devalution
(revaluation) percentage will be smaller.
IV. C. Trade and Exchange Rate Projections
Thissection compares three simulations with the trade—exchange rate
modeldescribed above. The simulations were designed to illustrate the
flexibility of the model and the type of information it generates.1
Exogenous Inputs
For these simulations it is assumed that GDP follows the path described
in section II for the twenty OECD countries. For Greece, New Zealand, Turkey,
the non—oil LDC's, OPEC, and the CPE's, the GDP growth rate is arbitrarily set.
The aid inflow to the LDC's is taken from World Bank 1976 SIMLINK projections.
The capital inf low to the CPE's declines steadily from its 1976 value to zero
by 1990. The final exogenous time series are the price of oil and OPEC imports.
For these runs we set the oil price index equal to the actual for 1975 through
1979 (as of July 1980) and to the 1979 value for 1981 through 1990. The OPEC
imports are equal to actual from 1975 through 1979 and then increase so that
OPEC has a zero balance on current account by 1990.
'The simulations reported here were carried out at NBER using the Harvard
Computing Center's ITEL/AS5 with a Fortran program written by Dennis Warner.—28—
The Three Simulations
Three simulations are compared here. First a flexible exchange rate
simulation is compared with a fixed exchange rate simulation. The fixed—rate
simulation is of no interest in itself. It is useful only in that it allows
an illustration of the importance of the flexible—rate model. The third
simulation is a flexible—rate run with an exogenous increase in Germany's
rate of growth of actual GDP. The comparison between this and the original
flexible rate run is meant to illustrate some aspects of the importance of
Germany as a "locomotive" in pulling the European train toward potential
output paths.
The Standard Simulation
Tables 11 and 12 display some results from the standard flexible—
exchange rate run. The figures in Table 11 show differences between the flexible
rate and fixed exchange rate simulations. In this table the cumulative
current account figures show that impossibly large net foreign asset positions
would result if exchange rates were fixed. Germany, Italy, the U.K., and
the U.S. would accumulate very large net foreign assets without flexible rates
while the LDC's and several smaller OECD countries would have huge net
liabilities. In general, the fastest growing countries (the LDC's and the
smaller OECD countries), are forced to depreciate to reduce their foreign lia-
bilities while the relatively slow—growing major OECD countries appreciate and
decrease their foreign assets compared to a fixed rate regime.
Table 11 shows also the changes in export market penetration caused by
the flexible exchange rate system. Countries which depreciate gain market share
and conversely for the appreciating countries.—29—
TABLE 11
ChangesCausedby Flexible Exchange Rates
Share of World Non-oil Cumulative Current
Goods Exports Account
___________79 85 90 79 85 90_
Canada .1 .1 —.1 —6.2 —29.2 —52.0
France .2 .5 .4 —2.6 9.0 20.6
Germany —.4 —.4 —.1 —17.6 —78.2 —137.9
Italy .0 —.4 —.6 —4.8 —58.0 —168.9
Japan .1.2 —1.3 —1.2 —36.2 —183.6 —383.3
U.K. —.4 —1.3 —1.5 —11.4 —112.1 —288.3
u.s. —.6 —1.0 —1.0 —33.7 —180.9 —406.5
LDCs 2.9 3.5 2.9 94.9 465.7 884.7
OPEC —.5 —.6 —.6 .3 18.0 61.6
CPEs —.1 —.3 —.4 —.3 —1.1 —1.4
Australia .0 .0 —.1 —.4 —6.3 —15.9
Austria .0 .1 .1 .9 4.4 14.0
Belgium .1 .0 .0 —2.9 —14.5 —19.5
Denmark .0 .1 .1 3.0 22.3 55.0
Finland .0 .2 .2 1.5 13.4 36.0
Iceland .0 .0 .0 .1 .1 .6
Ireland .0 .0 .1 .5 8.3 26.6
Netherlands —.1 —.1 .1 —6.5 —31.4 —35.5
Norway .1 .1 .0 10.7 116.4 91.5
Portugal .1 .2 .4 1.3 13.6 36.9
Spain .1 .2 .3 8.6 54.4 132.2
Sweden .1 .1 .2 2.7 28.6 74.9
Switzerland —.2 —.2 .0 11.3 —42.6 —77.2
Greece .1 .1 .2 2.8 14.6 53.0
New Zealand .1 .1 .1 2.3 9.6 18.0
Turkey .1 .3 .5 4.1 29.4 80.5—30—
TABLE 12
RealExchange1 World Market2 Balance on
Rate Share Petroleum Inflation
(1975=100)
19791985199019791985 1990 19781985 1990 3 4
1. Canada 106 112 113 4.5 3.83.4 1.4 .8 .9 .1 .0
2. France 95 86 86 7.4 7.97.6 —20.3 —25.3 —28.4 .2 .4
3. Germany 109 105 102 11.511.7 11.3 —16.9 —21.9 —24.2 .1 .1
4. Italy 105 117 120 4.4 4.44.4 —14.0 —18.4 —21.7 .3 —.4
5. Japan 116 119 121 9.0 9.8 10.7 —34.5 —46.1 —56..6 .3 .0
6. UnitedKlngdom 108 133 137 5.4 4.53.8—2.9 .0 .3 .2 —.6
7. United States 106 113 117 14.212.2 11.1 —25.8 —23.1 —25.1 .1 .0
8. LDCs 71 71 76 14.015.2 15.5 4.02.62.9 .0 .0
9. OPEC 105 112 116 4.1 4.34.8 150.7 188.4 277.0
10. CPEs 105 112 116 4.0 4.24.5 3.74.14.6
11. Australia 96 104 108 1.7 1.71.7 —.7—.8—.9 .1 .0
12. Austria 99 96 92 1.1 1.21.2—1.3 —1.9 —2.2 .1 .3
13. Belgium—Lux. 109 105 97 4.1 4.03.8—4.9 —6.5 —7.3 .2 .5
14. Denmark 87 72 67 1.1 1.11.0 —2.4 —3.2 —3.5 .1 1.0
15. Finland 73 50 42 .8 .9 .9—2.4 —3.2 —3.6 .2 2.2
16. Iceland 90 87 84 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .6
17. Ireland 100 96 91 .4 .4 .5 —.4—.5—.6 .1 .8
18. Netherlands114 106 96 5.0 5.35.4 —72.2 —17.5 —20.1 .3 .6
19. Norway 76 73 72 1.0 .9 .8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .8
20. Portugal 71 42 34 .3 .5 .7—1.1 —1.4 —1.6 .3 3.7
21. Spain 86 71 70 1.3 1.51.7—8.8 —12.0 —14.4 .3 .9
22. Sweden 85 63 56 2.2 2.01.9—5.7 —8.0 —8.5 .1 1.0
23. Switzerland126 119 110 1.6 1.51.6 —.7—.9 —1.0 .1 —.2
24. Greece 96 82 75 .4 .4 .5—1.6 —1.9 —2.2 .5 1.7
25. New Zealand 69 70 73 .4 .4 .4 —.3—.4—.4 .1 .3
26. Turkey 63 37 28 .4 .6 .8—2.3 —3.0 —3.4 .1 1.8
1. Index of ratio of US $denominatedGDP deflator to total trade weighted average
of trading partners US $denominatedGDP deflators, 1975=100.
2. Share of total world non—oil goods exports 1975 US $denominatedprices.
3. Increase in average annual inflation rate due to oil price increase.
4. Increase in average annual Inflation rate due to exchange rate changes.—31—
Table 12 gives further results for the standard flexible rate
simulation; the real exchange rates, world market shares, balance on petroleum,
and incremental inflation rates. All of the large OECD countries, except France,
and OPEC, CPES, Australia, and Switzerland have an increased real exchange rate
at the end of the simulation while the rest depreciate to varying degrees.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime with high growth, the largest gainers
inworld market shares are the fast growing countries; at the top of the list
comeJapan, OPEC and other LDC's. At the other end slow growing "mature" OECD
countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries are losing markets. These
changes are due to two types of effects. They can happen through market growth
depending on whether countries are exporting to the fast or slow growing markets
or through distribution effect: in the modela country with higher growth of
capacity output relative to that of its competitors means that the country in
question is capturing markets.
The balance of payments difficulties arising from different growth rates
of outputs under fixed exchange rate regimes imply potential pressures on countries'
exchange rates or on internal balance in the longer run. The flexible exchange
rate run produces one possibility to look at the pressures on exchange rates
of different countries and also to look at the consequences of this on the
market shares of different countries through changes in relative price competi-
tiveness. The projection shows the orders of magnitudes of these changes (see
real exchange rate column in Table 12). Japan, German, the Netherlands, Switzer—
land, Belgium, and the United Kingdom are appreciating their currencies in
real terms mostly due to a tendency to run current account surpluses under fixed
exchange rates. Surpluses and thus appreciation would occur, however, for
different reasons.—32—
Fast growing Japan is capturing markets but it also exports a remarkable
share to fast growing markets of LDC's. The latter is also true for Germany
being among major exporters to developing countries. The United Kingdom's
surplus is generated mainly due to slowly growing import demand but also to
fast growing markets for their exports in LDC's. The appreciation is also
reflected in market shares: in general, appreciating countries are losing
markets due to the weakening of their price competitiveness when compared to
the projection under the regime of fixed exchange rates. Scandinavian countries,
Mediterranean countries and non—oil LDC's are devaluing their currencies in
real terms as a consequence of running current account deficits with fixed
exchange rates. This is increasing their shares of world markets from what
they would be under the assumption of fixed exchange rates.
It should be noted here that the good export performance of Japan and
non—oil LDC's in the model is due to different reasons. Japan's success
comes from a better non—price competitiveness measured by relative growth
of capacity output (i.e., expanding productive capacity is assumed to be linked
with rapid introduction of technological innovation, intensified export promo-
tion, etc.), while at the same time Japan is experiencing losses due to the
appreciating yen. In the case of non—oil LDC's, both better price and non—price
competitiveness are helping to increase market share. The channel through in-
crease price—competitiveness due to a large devaluation of LDC's currencies is
much more important as indicated by comparison between fixed and flexible ex-
change rate runs of Table 11; under fixed rate assumptions non—oil LDC's world
market shares increase from 11.1 percent in 1979 to 12.6 percent in 1990 but
jumps 4.4 percentage points from this to 15.5 percent due to the introduction
of the flexible exchange rate regime. It is obvious that the flexible exchange
rate run overestimates non—oil LDC's share.-.33—
The final columns in Table 13 show the incremental inflation rates.
Since there is no money growth or excess demand for goods in this model there
are only two causes for an increase in the domestic GDP deflators: exogenous
oil price increases and exchange rate changes. The first of the two columns
shows the average increase in the inflation rate due to the exogenous oil price
increase while the second gives the changes in inflation rates due to changes
of exchange rates. For the appreciating countries there are deflationary pres-
sures while for depreciating countries there are inflationary pressures. The
effects of exchange rate movements on the domestic price level are more pro-
nounced for the smaller and more open economies.
HigherGrowth in Germany
For this simulation itwasassumed thatGermany'sgrowth rate of output
was,on average, one percentage point higher than in the standard run. Here
we compare the results of the two simulations to illustrate some of the cross—
country linkages present in the model.
Due to the higher growth Germany's current account is lowered (see Table
13) and its real exchange rate depreciates by 23% by 1990. This depreciation
lowers the relative price of German exports, giving it an additional 1.4% of the
world's non—oil goods market by 1990 and causing a 0.4% increase in theaverage
domestic inflation rate.
The countries affected most strongly are France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands. For all countries there are two
primary channels of influence; the exchange rate determination system and the
current account. France's, Italy's, and the U.K.'s exchange rates are linked
directly to Germany's current account. Initially Germany's current account
worsens due to higher import demand, while theirs improves because of higher—34—
TABLE 13
Changes Caused by Increased German Growth











1.Canada .0 —.1 .0
2.France .0 —.2 —.4
3.Germany .0 .9 1.4
4.Italy -.1 —.1 .0
5.Japan .0 —.2 —.2
6.United Kingdom-.1 —.1 —.1
7.United States.0 —.2 —.3
8.LDCs .0 —.3 —.4
9.OPEC .0 —.1 —.1






































































































































exports to Germany. This causes France's, Italy's and the U.N.'s exchange rates
to appreciate and Germany's to depreciate. In the longer run theappreciation
of the three currencies outweigh the direct stimulus fromGermany's import
demand and the current accounts weaken. All three lose market sharesand
experience a decline in their inflation rates.
For the smaller European countries the effects are somewhat different.
With the exception of Ireland, whose exchange rate isclosely linked to the
U.K.'s, all experience an improved trade, and, hence, current account balance
because of increased German demand. AU of their exchange ratesappreciate
slightly and their inflation rates are lowered. Here it must be remembered
that output is always kept at an exogenous level so there isno labor market
pressure on costs, only pressure from the change In prices of imported goods.
The effects on the non—European countries are relatively small. OPEC
does experience a significant increase in its current account dueto increased
oil exports to Germany. The effects on Canada,Japan, the U.S., Australia,
and New Zealand are very small.